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Pharmaceutical Patent Protection:
More Generic Favored Legislation May
Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull
the Plug on Innovation
BY MANDY WILSON
INTRODUCTION
In today's fast-paced world where Americans crave a quick fix to their
medical woes, it takes more than advice on a healthy lifestyle to
satisfy consumers. But along with cutting-edge drugs emerging into the
marketplace come their price tags. Americans reportedly spent $125 billion
on drugs in 1999, and with baby-boomers headed toward retirement the
spending will most likely grow.'
The consumers, frustrated with high prices, are being heard by
politicians, making prescription drug cost a major legislative issue today
Recently, several bills were introduced in Congress having a potential
effect on the speed with which generic drugs will enter the market.' The
Pharmaceutical Reform Act of 2000 was introduced by Representatives
Alan Mollohan (D-West Virginia) and Ken Calvert (R-California)
Senators John McCain (R-Arizona), Charles Schumer (D-New York), and
Tim Johnson (D-South Dakota)5 and Representatives John Baldacci (D-
Maine) and Tome Coburn (R-Oklahoma) 6 introduced the Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act in the Senate and House, respectively.7
J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.1DavidNoonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 24.
2See id.; see also Pharmaceutical Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 5231,106th Cong.
(2000); Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 5247, 106th
Cong. (2000); Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 3051, 106th
Cong. (2000).
3See, e.g., H.R. 5231; H.R. 5247; S. 3051.
4 H.R. 5231.
5S. 3051.
6 H.R. 5247.
S. 3051; H.R. 5247.
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American consumers will initially receive the benefit of lower-priced
drugs if generic entry into the marketplace is further accelerated by the
enactment of these bills, but lower-priced drugs today may actually mean
higher overall health care costs and fewer new drug options in the future.
Investment in pharmaceuticals is already risky; expediting generic entry
into the marketplace diminishes the effective patent term of pioneer drugs,
thereby increasing the risk of investment in drugs. A secure patent term
provides an incentive for pioneer drug manufacturers to spend money on
new and better medications because it increases the probability that a profit
can be made after the large research and development costs are recovered.
Diminishing the effective patent term will reduce the incentive to develop
pioneer drugs and may result in fewer new and improved medications.
Pharmaceuticals are a cost-effective alternative to otherhealth care options.
Overall health care costs may rise under a scheme where fewer new drugs
enter the market, forcing use of potentially more expensive treatment
alternatives.
This Note begins by discussing factors-that contribute to the expense
of pharmaceuticals.8 Part II includes a brief overview of patent protection
in the United States and its importance to pioneer drug companies Part III
examines the correlation between intellectual property protection and an
incentive to invest in new drug development.'0 Part IV discusses conditions
favoring generic drug companies at the expense of pioneer drug companies
and recently proposed legislation." Finally, Part V will explore the societal
costs associated with truncated pharmaceutical patent terms.
12
I. RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INVESTMENT IN
PHARMACEUTICALS CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH COST OF DRUGS
The following factors contribute to the risk associated with the future
income generated by a new drug.
A. Research and Development
Research and development results in a negative cash flow for drug
companies prior to introduction of a drug. Current research and develop-
8 See infra Part I.
9 See infra Part II.
'0 See infra Part III.
1 See infra Part IV.
'2 See infra Part V.
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ment of novel drugs is becoming increasingly complex. Therefore, it costs
approximately $200 - $500 million 3 for pioneer companies to develop a
new drug. 4 As a result of decreased patent terms, risk of liability, and
increased research and development costs, some drugs are no longer
profitable for companies to develop.15
B. Food and Drug Administration Approval
One factor distinguishing drugs from other products are the Food and
Drug Administration's ("FDA") pre-market approval and post-market
surveillance requirements established by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act ("FFDCA")."6 Perhaps the biggest safeguard against drugs
entering the market with the unknown potential to harm is the prerequisite
of approval by the FDA. To obtain FDA approval, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer must run extensive investigations on its new drug. 7 An
applicant must generate data about the drug, including chemical structure,
safety, efficacy, and toxicology analyses in vitro and in animals."
The FDA may request further studies, after which human clinical trials
may begin. 9 Clinical trials involve three phases." Phase I trials are
designed to generate data regarding the metabolic and pharmacologic
effects of the drug in humans.2 This phase of the trials involves a small test
population of adults and also produces information about potential side
13 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GEN-
ERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 54 (1998) (prices given in 1990 dollars); see also Pharm. Research and
Mfrs. of Am., PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, at 25, at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/publications/profileOO (last visited Oct. 5,2001) [hereinafter PhRMA
Industry Profile 2000].
4 Because a generic drug company can copy the formulation of a pioneer drug
and even use the pioneer drug company's data to supplement its FDA approval
application, the cost of getting a generic drug approved is only about $1 million for
bioequivalence testing. See PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 101.
15 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13, at 47.
16 21 U.S.C §§ 301-395 (1994).
" W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETONHALL
L. REv. 1437, 1442-46 (1994).
1821 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2001).
'9 Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1443.
2 0 1d
21 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).
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effects.' Phase II trials are conducted on a larger population of adults; this
time the subjects have the specific condition of interest. This second
phase is designed to determine the effectiveness of the drug on the
condition.24 The final phase of clinical trials involves a much larger test
population of adults afflicted with the condition of interest.' Upon
culmination of Phase III trials, aNew Drug Application ("NDA") is filed.26
An NDA "include[s] detailed reports of all animal studies and clinical
testing done with the drug, reports of any adverse reactions, and any other
pertinent information from worldwide scientific literature."27 In addition,
the manufacturer must submit "specimens of the labeling proposed to be
used for [the] drug."'2
The FDA extensively scrutinizes the data contained in the NDA 9 The
entire NDA process takes approximately five to seven years." During this
time, the FDA makes a risk-benefit assessment to determine whether the
product will benefit the overall health of the public and must ensure that
both safety and efficacy are established by scientific data.3" The FDA is
relied upon for its extensive knowledge of pre-market drug testing and its
ability to analyze the data generated therefrom.32 Even after market
approval, the FDA continues exercising its authority by conducting
extensive post-market surveillance.3 The FFDCA requires drug manufac-
turers to monitor drug effects that are seen by physicians and patients?1
Ongoing research is also required.35
C. Marketability Risk
Not all drugs are successful; thus, companies need to develop highly
profitable drugs not only to recover the investment in the profitable drug,
I d; Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1443;
Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1443.
2421 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
2 See id § 312.21(c).
2621 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
27 Pennington Parker Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can
Courts Co-regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.1 85, 100 (1988).
2821 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F).
29 See Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1444.
30 I d
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
32 See Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1442-44.
33 1d at 1447.
3421 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2001).
35 Id
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but also to recoup for drugs that failed either before or after they made it to
the market 6 A recent Congressional Budget Office Study did calculations
on sixty-seven proprietary drugs. Of these products, the top six collec-
tively earned $1 billion, but only the top twenty earned enough to exceed
the average cost of research and development of a single new drug." Such
statistics show that less than one in three pioneer drugs can make a profit
in the current market 9
D. Risk of Drug Design Defect Suits
Drugs constitute a unique class of products. They have the ability to
save and greatly improve lives; however, if used by the wrong person, they
also have the ability to do great damage. Slight variations in personal
biological pathways ensure that all drugs will not affect all people the same
way. "There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe [for all people] for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs.
'"0
Even after the FDA has completed its analysis of the safety and
efficacy of a new drug, a pharmaceutical company must consider the risks
of a product liability suit being brought based on a design defect in a newly
marketed drug. Regardless ofa potential plaintiff's ability to establish that
the drug caused an injury, defending such a suit is costly. Even the potential
that a drug design defect suit would have to be defended creates a risk for
new drug investment.
E. Competition from Pioneer Manufacturers
In addition, the possession of a patent does not provide the monopoly
that one might expect.41 Frequently, drugs target a single reaction in a
36 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13, at 48.
37Id
38 Id
" See id at 45 (stating that passage of new pro-generic legislation may further
decrease the number of pioneer drugs that can make a profit).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). The exclusivity period granted to an inventor
under the patent act does not necessarily provide a drug inventor with a monopoly
on a given treatment. Pharmaceuticals work by targeting the complex mechanisms
of the human. These complex biochemical pathways can be affected in more than
one way, making patented drugs targets of efforts to design around their patents.
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specific biochemical pathway to produce an altered biological outcome.
Because these pathways involve multiple and complex processes, more
than one novel compound may produce the same desired results. By
targeting a different step in a multi-reaction biochemical pathway, a
competitor can design around a pioneer pharmaceutical company's patent,
limiting its market protection.42
F. Competition from Generic Manufacturers
This Note focuses on the drug investment risk associated with
competition from generic drug manufacturers. Patent protection is
important to predicting profitability ofa developing drug. The moment that
a drug is released on the market, its chemical composition is available for
analysis and can be subsequently copied by generic competitors. Patent
protection is the only defense that a pioneer pharmaceutical company has
to prevent forfeiting much of its research and development investment to
generic companies who are able to cheaply copy the pioneer.43 Diminishing
the effective patent term for pioneer drugs expedites generic entry into the
marketplace, resulting in diminished market security for the pioneer drug
and the creation of a risk that the drug investment will not be profitable."
Regardless of the adverse incentive created by truncated patent terms, the
current congressional approach to targeting high drug cost is to expedite
generic competition.45 The societal cost generated from this type of adverse
incentive will be further discussed in Part V of this Note.4
II. PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Congress takes its power to legislate patent protection from the patent
clause of the United States Constitution.47 The drafters of the Constitution
believed that inventors should be rewarded for their discoveries with a
Should a second pioneer be successful at designing around a drug patent, a second
pioneer drug could appear on the market eliminating the original patented drug's
"monopoly" on its treatment. See PhRMA Industy Profile 2000, supra note 13, at
100-01; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13, at 3.
42 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13, at 3.
" See PhRM Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102.
44 See id at 100-04.
41 See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
46 See infra Part V.
47 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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limited monopoly "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'4
Congress began recognizing patents as early as 1790' and established the
United States Patent Office in 183630 In 1952, with continued use of this
constitutional power, Congress assembled a Patent Act based on review of
potential inventions by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO").5 1 The USPTO now has the power to grant inventors limited
monopolies in exchange for disclosure of their inventions.52 An inventor is
required to submit a specification, 3 which is "a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains... to make and use the same. ' "s In addition to this
detailed description, the inventor is required to give his or her own
subjective opinion of the preferred embodiment, or best mode, of the
invention 5 Ultimately, the inventor's submission will be scrutinized to
determine whether it meets the statutory requirements of usefulness,
novelty, and non-obviousness.' This incentive-based program endures
today, with only a few exceptions5 7 Many of the recent exceptions,
described below, are directed towards the pharmaceutical industry."
The moment that a drug is released on the market, competitors can copy
its composition. Trade secret protection for composition is therefore
impossible. 9 Thus, patent protection has significant importance in the
4s Id.
41 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
'o Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
-" See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1994).52 See id
53 Id
54 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
5 5See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293.
161d. §§ 101-103.
' 7See id §§ 1-293.
58 See, e.g., The Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
s9 In the case of a drug invention, the drug itself (the subject of patent pro-
tection) is placed on the market, and anyone is free to purchase that drug. This
differs from other inventions, such as a method of making a drug. The method can
be kept secret by limiting use of the method to laboratories within the inventor
company's facility-thus, a patented method has the ability to become a trade
secret.
A drug, on the other hand, cannot be kept secret if it is to be marketed. Once on
the market, a competitor can purchase the drug and easily determine its compo-
sition. Thus, it cannot be kept secret while being marketed. This is just the nature
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pharmaceutical industry. Pioneer companies, the inventors, expend large
amounts of money on research and development, while generic companies
are able to copy the pioneer drug composition at relatively little cost.'
The average effective patent life for products other than pharma-
ceuticals is 18.5 years.6" Amendments to the FFDCA62 and the Patent Act63
have whittled the average effective patent life for pharmaceuticals down to
between eleven and twelve years in the 1990s.' An adequate patent
protection term is required for pioneer companies to recover their expenses
and produce a profit.65 With the risk of even shorter terms, the incentive to
pay the price associated with innovation" is likely to decrease.6'
Ill. CORRELATION BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION-BASED LEGISLATION AND INVESTMENT IN NEW
PHARMACEUTICAL DEVELOPMENT
The correlation between legislation protecting pioneer drug manufac-
turers and introduction of novel treatments on the market is very real.
Modifications to the FFDCA and the Patent Act in the past twenty years
have greatly affected patent terms. Not surprisingly, the extent of intellec-
tual property protection strongly influences the investment decisions of
pharmaceutical companies."' These companies have indicated that sixty-
five percent of their drugs would not have been developed or commercially
introduced if patent protection had not been available.69
The Orphan Drug Act70 was enacted temporarily in 1983, reenacted
periodically, and permanently reenacted in 1994. The Act creates incentives
of this particular invention. If patent protection was not available, there would be
nothing stopping immediate copying and marketing by competitors.
6 See PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102.611d
62 21 U.S.C §§ 301-393 (1994).
6335 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1994).
64 PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 103.65 See id at 100-04; see generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13.
"PhRM Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 101. The cost of research
and development for a drug introduced in 1990 has been estimated to be as much
as $500 million. Id
67 Id at 100.
68 Id at 104 fig. 8-5 (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYPRO-
TECTON, DIRECr INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1995)).69Id at 100 fig. 8-1.
7oOrphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at21
U.S.C. §§ 360-393 (1994)).
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for inventors of "orphan drugs."' These rewards include federal funding
for research and clinical trials, beneficial tax credits, and the exclusive right
to market a qualified drug for a limited period.' To qualify as an orphan
drug, the product must treat a rare disease or condition 3 The FFDCA
defines a "rare disease' as one affecting less than 200,000 people in the
United States.74 Congress enacted the Orphan Drug legislation to encourage
research and development of treatment for rare diseases, as the market for
treatments of rare diseases, by nature, is not highly profitable.7'
A total often orphan drugs were approved from 1972 to 1982, the ten
years before the Orphan Drug Act was passed.76 Since its enactment, there
have been 193 orphan drugs approved. 7 The response to the Orphan Drug
Act is an example of how favorably the industry responds to increased
intellectual property protection that lowers the risk of investing in research,
development, and marketing of a new drug.
The Pediatric Exclusivity Section of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997"8 is similar incentive-based legislation.79 The
Pediatric Section offers an exclusivity period of six months following a
patent term to pioneer companies conducting clinical investigations to
determine safe and effective doses for children."
As the Pediatric Exclusivity Section is relatively recent legislation, its
effect on the entry of pediatric drugs into the market is not clear. Unfortu-
nately, the exclusivity provision expired on January 1, 2002."1 Some argue
that without reenactment of this provision, the "number of prescription
drugs indicated for pediatric patients will likely remain unchanged. 82 A
permanent reenactment, similar to that of the Orphan Drug Act, could allow
the true effect of this targeted legislation to be seen.
71 Id § l(aX2).
r David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan DrugAct: An Engine oflnnovation? At
What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 127 (2000).
73 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
74 1d
7
' Rohde, supra note 72, at 127.
76 PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 42.
77Id
78 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1998)).
79 See Kurt R. Karst, Pediatric Testing of Prescription Drugs: The Food and
Drug Administration's Carrot and Stickfor the Pharmaceutical Industry, 49 AM.
U. L. REV. 739, 743 (2000).
&o Id. at 742-43.
' 21 U.S.C. § 355a(j) (Supp. V 2000).
82 Karst, supra note 79, at 772.
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IV. CONDITIONS LIMITING PATENT TERMS AND OTHERWISE
FAVORING GENERIC DRUGS AT THE EXPENSE OF PIONEER DRUGS
A. Substitution Laws
Although control over pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical patents is
usually thought to lie with Congress and such federal agencies as the FDA
and the USPTO, state legislatures have passed laws that affect the
pharmaceutical market. 3 Anti-substitution laws, which forbid substituting
any drug brand that is not specifically prescribed, is an example of such a
law." A pharmacist practicing in a state where an anti-substitution law has
been enacted cannot sell a generic drug to a patient if the physician
prescribed a brand name drug. 5 Prior to 1970, almost every state had
enacted anti-substitution laws."' The purpose of these laws was to ensure
that the patient received the exact drug prescribed and that the physicians
would have the right to control the drug selection of his or her patients. 7
Consumer advocates saw these laws, not as safety measures, but as tools for
drug price exploitation.' These advocates argued that if there were bio-
equivalent drugs capable of being dispensed at a lower cost to patients, the
pharmacist should not be limited to dispensing the brand name prescribed.
In response to growing public adversity to the laws, every state repealed its
anti-substitution law.89
Many states followed the Model Drug Product Selection Act ("Model
Act"), published by the Federal Trade Commission," when repealing their
anti-substitution laws and enacting substitution laws. The Model Act
allows, but does not require, pharmacists to substitute a generic drug for a
prescribed brand name drug when such a substitution would cost the patient
less."' The result of adopting the Model Act is that a pharmacist may rely
on his or her professional opinion as to whether a generic drug is bio-
equivalent to the prescribed drug, precluding the need to defer to the exact
language of the physician's prescription.'
83E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 217.822 (Michie 1995).
PHARM. LAW DIGEST 249 (Joseph L. Fink III et al. eds., 35th ed. 2000).
86 Id
87 Id
& Id
19 Id at 250.
'MODELDRUGPRODUCTSELECTIONACT, reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION 15-17 (1979).
91 PHARM. LAW DIGEST, supra note 84, at 250.
92 id
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Some states go much further and actually encourage, even require, the
pharmacist to substitute drugs in certain situations.93 These substitution
laws are one example of a condition favoring the generic drug industry. In
addition to state legislation, federal administrative regulations and
legislative enactments result in increasing the generic drug market share at
the expense of the pioneer drug manufacturers.'
B. Administrative Delays
While the statutory patent term for utility patents is a generous twenty
years,95 barriers exist that can substantially limit their effective lifetime.
For example, a patent term begins to run the day that a patent application
is filed," and patent registration can take several years of prosecution
in the USPTO' The average prosecution time for a U.S. patent is 3.4
The Kentucky substitution statute, K.1.S. § 217.822 (Michie 1995), states:
(1) When a pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name drug
which is not listed by generic name in the nonequivalent drug product
formulary prepared by the board, he shall select a lower priced
therapeutically equivalent drug which he has in stock, unless otherwise
instructed by the purchaser or his physician, provided however that if such
selection is made, the label on the container of the drug shall show the name
of the drug dispensed.
(2) When an equivalent drug product is dispensed in lieu of a brand
name drug prescribed, the price of the equivalent drug product dispensed
shall be lower in price to the purchaser than the drug product prescribed.
(3) If, in the opinion of a practitioner, it is to the best interest of his
patient that an equivalent drug should not be dispensed, he may indicate in
the manner of his choice on the prescription "Do Not Substitute," except
that the indication shall not be preprinted on a prescription.
(4) The selection of any drug by a pharmacist under the provisions of
this section shall not constitute the practice of medicine.
(5) A pharmacist who selects an equivalent drug product pursuant to
KRS 217.815 to 217.826 assumes no greater liability for selecting the
dispensed drug product than would be incurred in dispensing a prescription
for a drug product prescribed by its generic name.
(6) When a pharmacist receives a generically written prescription for a
multiple source drug product, he shall dispense an equivalent drug product
in accordance with the provisions of KRS 217.815 to 217.826.
9 See infra notes 95-172 and accompanying text.
95 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (1994).
6 Id
' Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA
Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651, 656 (1996).
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years.98 For a biotechnology patent, the average prosecution time is
increased to 4.4 years." A pioneer pharmaceutical is not protected until
successful prosecution has been completed and a patent registers. By this
time, it has lost several years of its twenty-year term.
In addition, before the drug can enter the marketplace, it must meet the
guidelines set out in the FFDCA,' which include review by the FDA.'
The actual FDA approval times have decreased in recent years from thirty
to fifteen months." The administrative delays of both the USPTO and the
FDA result in an abbreviated patent life, or effective patent term, which is
much smaller than the twenty-year statutory term found in the Patent Act. °3
C. The Drug Price Competition andPatent Term Restoration Act of 1984
Although its name implies that it favors longer patent terms for pioneer
drugs, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984"'° actually results in shorter effective patent terms."' Although it was
purported to be an attempt to strike a balance between generic and pioneer
drug marketing, the Act was much more beneficial to generic drug
companies than it was to pioneer drug companies.1°6
In the early 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry was feeling the effect
of increased FDA regulations.0 7 These regulations resulted in more
rigorous testing requirements for approval, increased review periods, and
"' Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22
AIPLA Q. J. 369,420 (1994).
" Id at 406.
100 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
'o' Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2001).
o Deborah G. Parver, Expediting the Drug Approval Process: An Analysis of
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 51 ADMiN. L. REv. 1249, 1255 (1999);
Viscusi, supra note 17, at 1444 (the entire new drug application process, including
clinical trials, takes approximately five to seven years).
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
04 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C.).
s See PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 103.
'o See generally Susan Kopp Keyack, Note, The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21
RUTGERS L.J. 147, 152 (1989); Ned Milenkovich, Comment, Deleting the Bolar
Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act: Harmonizing Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 751 (1999).
o7Keyack, supra note 106, at 153-54.
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truncated patent terms for pioneer drug companies.108 The generic drug
companies were also affected by FDA approval requirements, causing
delay in getting their product to market."° Both pioneer and generic drug
companies, eager to increase their market share, began congressional
lobbying efforts. In addition, the two industries battled each other in
court.110
Roche Products, Inc. v. BolarPharmaceutical Co., was one such battle.
In Bolar, a pioneer company sought an injunction to keep a generic drug
company from using its product during the patent term."' The generic drug
company argued that its possession of the plaintiff's product was for the
purpose of performing tests required for FDA approval of its generic drug
equivalent and that such use was an exception to infringement'12 under the
experimental use doctrine."3 The court of appeals held that the generic drug
company's use was not experimental, but instead was "a violation of the
patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry' . . . [for] commercial
purposes.""" Generic companies claimed that this definition of infiinge-
ment gave pioneer companies market exclusivity that extended beyond the
term of their patent.1 5 Generic companies would have to wait until the
pioneer patent expired before starting the lengthy FDA approval process on
their generic drug equivalent."6 At the same time, pioneer companies were
demanding extended terms to make up for lost time resulting from lengthy
FDA approval for the pioneer drugs themselves." 7 Congress stepped in to
provide relief in the form of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration actof 1984 ("l984Act"),"8 also known asthe "Hatch-Waxman
Act."
," 9
109 Id at 154 n.53.
"' See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
"1 Id at 860.
12 See 35 U.S.C. §.271(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
1"3 Bolar, 733 F.2dat 862 (citing Peppenhausenv. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279)).
114 Id at 863.
"' See Keyack, supra note 106, at 154-55.
16 See id
17 See id
"a Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C.).
"9 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 was
drafted by Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman.
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The 1984 Act was a combination of two bills pending in Congress. One
bill would shorten the FDA application and approval process for generic
drugs, while the other would restore pioneer drug patent time lost during
FDA approval.120 The resulting Act was eventually adopted, significantly
altering sections of both the FFDCA" and the Patent Act." 2
Title I of the 1984 Act" was designed to benefit the generic drug
companies for the purpose of increasing access to generic drugs at a lower
cost to consumers. This end was achieved by establishing an Abbreviated
New Drug Approval application ("ANDA'), which substantially short-
ened approval time in the FDA for generic drugs. 24 A generic drug
company meeting the statutory requirements can file an ANDA and
receive a response from the FDA within 180 days."2 These statutory
requirements include: (1) a showing that the proposed generic drug is
the same as, or bio-equivalent to, an FDA approved drug;2 6 (2) submis-
sion of a certification disclosing whether that approved drug is pro-
tected by a patent;'27 and (3) submission of a statement that the applicant
does not use a method of producing the proposed generic drug that is
protected by a method of production patent.' Once an ANDA applicant is
approved, the generic drug may enter the market absent a patent infringe-
ment claim.'2 9 To increase the incentive for a generic drug company to
quickly file an ANDA, the first approved ANDA applicant will enjoy a
180-day exclusivity period against competing ANDA versions of the
drug.1
30
Title II of the 1984 Act was designed to benefit pioneer drug
companies for the purpose of providing incentives for increased research
and development of new drugs by offering an extension of the patent term
120 Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75
NoTRE DAM L. REv. 309, 316 (1999).
121 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
1235 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
12321 U.S.C. § 355.
' 24 § 3550)(1).
121 Id § 3550)(4)(A).
126 1d § 3556)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
1
27 d § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
'28 Id § 3550)(2)(A)(viii).
1
29 Id § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
130 Id § 355()(5)(B)(iv).
131 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
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where certain statutory conditions are met.'32 The extension is based on the
time lost during the FDA approval process.'
In addition to providing this benefit to pioneer drug companies, Title
II also created a new exception to patent infringement.'34 This alteration to
the Patent Act is known as the "Bolar Amendment" because it overruled
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,"' wherein the court
held that the generic drug company's use of a patented product for
performing tests required for FDA approval of its bioequivalent drug was
infringement.'36 Title II, while purportedly designed to benefit pioneer drug
companies, actually gave generic drug companies a windfall.137 The Patent
Act awards a patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the
patented invention, but the Bolar Amendment takes the exclusive right to
132 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) states:
The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product,
or a method of manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance
with this section from the original expiration date of the patent if-
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is
submitted under subsection (d)(1) for its extension;
(2) the term of the patent has never been extended under subsection
(e)(1) of this section;
(3) an application for extension is submitted by the owner of record of
the patent or its agent and in accordance with the requirements of
paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d);
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its
commercial marketing or use.
133 Id § 156(d)(1).
134 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) states: "It shall not be an act of infringement to make,
use, or sell a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .... "
1
3
' Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided two very similar cases in 1984,
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. and Paper ConvertingMachine
Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In both Bolar and
Magna-Graphics, the court found that the defendant's commercial development of
a product patented by the plaintiff during the term of the patent constituted
infringement. In Bolar, the product was a pharmaceutical; in Magna-Graphics, the
product was an automatic paper-rewinding machine. The 1984 Act carefully carved
out an exception to patent infringement for pharmaceuticals by overruling Bolar
but not Magna-Graphics, which continues to be good law.
136 Bolar, 733 F.2d at 863.
137 Keyack, supra note 106, at 160-61.
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use their patented invention away from pioneer drug companies.' This
exception to infringement only occurs in the field of pharmaceutical
patents; all other patent holders continue to have the exclusive right to use
their patented invention during the term of the patent. 39
Another benefit of the 1984 Act to pioneer drug companies is patent
term extensions for time lost during FDA approval;"4 however, these
extensions are very limited and do not make up for the exclusivity period
taken away by the other provisions of the 1984 Act 14 1 Patent restoration
under the 1984 Act limits extension such that the maximum patent term
may not exceed fourteen years. Thus, it is virtually impossible, even
under patent term restoration, for a pharmaceutical patent term to be as
lengthy as the average eighteen and a half-year patent term for any other
invention. 143
In addition, generic companies are no longer required to conduct the
expensive clinical trials required for FDA approval; instead, they can rely
on the trials conducted by pioneer companies and merely conduct relatively
inexpensive bioequivalence studies.'" This new legislation not only saves
generic companies substantial amounts of money in research costs, but also
allows for a much shorter FDA approval period for generic drugs, resulting
in increased speed to market. 145
With the benefits of shortened FDA approval and the Bolar Amend-
ment's new exception to patent infringement, a generic drug has the ability
to be on the market almost immediately after a pioneer patent expires. 146
Before 1984, generic drug companies could not begin drug development,
clinical trials, or the FDA approval process until the pioneer patent had
expired. 47 Clinical trials and FDA approval take approximately eight and
a half years to complete;' thus, the 1984 Act resulted in cutting pioneer
drug effective patent terms by several years. Although the 1984 Act was
considered a compromise at the time it was passed, generic companies
"8 Id at 160.
13 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994).
'" Id (the extension is limited to a fourteen-year effective term).
'41 Keyack, supra note 106, at 158, 160-61.
142 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2000).
143 PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102-03.
'" See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A) (2000).
145 See Reid, supra note 120, at 317-18.
146 Keyack, supra note 106, at 160.
'4 7 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (added in 1984).
14 8 Price, supra note 97, at 656.
[VOL. 90
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION
appear to have gained more than they have lost-at the expense of pioneer
companies.14 9
D. The 1996 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the 1984 Act
Despite the lack of balance in the 1984 Act, little has been done to
counteract the disadvantage it has placed on pioneer drug companies. In
1996, a Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings to answer the question:
"If we placed our 'legislator's level' on the Hatch-Waxman Act today,
would it still be in balance?"" The co-drafters of the 1984 Act continued
to be pleased with their piece of legislation, as was apparent through their
comments at the 1996 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the 1984
Act.' Ultimately the co-drafters found the "legislator's level" to be in
balance as they affirmatively answered the posed question." 2
Senator Hatch stated his belief that the 1984 Act is still the most
important consumer bill of the decade, while Representative Waxman
called it one of his "proudest achievements."' Not surprisingly, witnesses
from the generic drug industry praised the Act's success." 4
Representatives of the pioneer drug companies did not share the same
enthusiasm as the generic representatives. Gerald Mossinghoff, President
of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA"), agreed that generic drugs are less expensive but pointed out
that these low prices result from the fact that "pharmaceuticals are
extremely expensive and difficult to develop, [but] they can be copied
cheaply and easily."' Mr. Mossinghoff further noted that research and
development costs had increased and commented on how "expensive and
risky" the pioneer drug industry had become." 6 He concluded that while
innovation had a history of improving health through new drug technology,
innovation and technology goals can only be met if strong patent protection
is afforded to manufacturers. 7
"' Keyack, supra note 106, at 158, 160-61.
"0 Reid, supra note 120, at 327 (quoting Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Inter-
preting GATT. Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th
Cong. 93, 96-97 (1998) (prepared statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)).
151 Id
1
52
d 
1
53 
d
154 Id
s51 Id at 328.
156 d
1571dt
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Research and development costs for pioneer drugs are approximately
$200-500 million. 58 Since generic companies can copy the formulation of
a pioneer drug and even use the data of a pioneer drug company to
supplement its FDA approval application, the cost of getting a generic drug
approved is only about $1 million for bioequivalence testing.' 59
The committee was not swayed by the witnesses representing the
pioneer industry and closed the Hearings without significantly changing the
1984 Act. 6°
E. Recent Legislation Favors Inventors But Does Not Target
Pharmaceutical Inventors
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 ("AIPA"), 6 ' attempts
to give across-the-board intellectual property protection rather than focus
on a discrete area such as "orphan drugs" or "pediatric drugs."'62 AIPA,
which was passed by Congress onNovember 29, 1999,163 positively affects
patent terms, among other things, and can therefore be thought of as
incentive-based legislation. Subtitle D ofAppendixI of the Act, entitled the
Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999 ("PTGA"), applies to any patent
application'" filed on or after May 29, 2000.165 The PTGA allows for
patent extensions to compensate for delays in USPTO examinations and in
prosecution that extend more then three years." Because the statutory
patent term is twenty years from the date of filing, 67 the PTGA extension
guarantees most patents a minimum seventeen-year patent term. This
extension is available to pharmaceutical patents.161 Pharmaceutical patents,
however, will seldom experience a patent term of seventeen years because,
'
5S CONG. BUDGETOFFICE STUDY, supranote 13, at 38,48 (prices given in 1990
dollars); PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 25, 101.
'59PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 101.
'6 Reid, supra note 120, at 329.
16 1 Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-
557.
162 See generally id
163 Id
'6' See id Design patents are not eligible for adjustment under this Act. Id
165 Changes to Application Examination and Provisional Application Practice,
65 Fed. Reg. 14,865 (Mar. 20,2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
'6 See Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999 § 4402.
167 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
" Changes to Application Examination and Provisional Application Practice,
65 Fed. Reg. 14,865 (Mar. 20,2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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before placing a patented drug on the market, it must go through not only
prosecution or examination in the USPTO, but also the drug testing and
approval process in the FDA.169
Because FDA approval causes pharmaceuticals additional delay in
getting on the market, pioneer drug companies must continue to rely on
"Patent Term Restoration" under the 1984 Act 7" to make up for this delay.
"Patent Term Restoration" only allows for a maximum effective life of
fourteen years after FDA approval.' Because of safety concerns, the
standards for FDA-approved drugs should not be decreased in order to
increase the rate of FDA approval. Due to the pressures that the application
examiners are under, it is unlikely that the approval time in the FDA will
decrease for other reasons."z Accordingly, it will be impossible for PTGA
to actually guarantee all patents a life of seventeen years without allowing
pharmaceutical patents aterm extension fortime lost during FDA approval.
F. ProposedLegislation with Potential to Further Affect Pharmaceutical
Patent Terms
Although interest in amending the 1984 Act was not present during the
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings in 1996, interest has since grown. In
September 2000 alone, several bills suggesting amendments to the 1984
Act were introduced targeting high health care costs."n Today, however,
the congressmen proposing amendments do not seem concerned with
answering the question: "If we placed our 'legislator's level' on the Hatch-
Waxman Act today, would it still be in balance?"174 The recently proposed
bills do not attempt to balance the pioneer and generic drug companies'
concerns, but rather propose to tip the scale even further in favor of generic
drug companies.7 5
169 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 131; Investigational New Drug Appli-
cation, 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2001); PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at
102.
' PhRMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102.
171 Id
172Parver, supra note 102, at 1264-65. Reviewers are under pressure to approve
drugs from drug manufacturers, physicians, and Wall Street. Id
17 See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 5231, 106th Cong.
(2000); Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 5247, 106th
Cong. (2000); Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 3051, 106th
Cong. (2000).
i Reid, supra note 120, at 327.
'
7s See H.R. 5231; H.R. 5247; S. 3051.
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Amendments to the FFDCA and the Patent Act with respect to
abbreviated applications (ANDA) for the approval of new drugs are
proposed in the Pharmaceutical Reform Act of 2000,76 introduced by
Representatives Alan Mollohan (D-West Virginia) and Ken Calvert (R-
California).
77
Currently, under the FFDCA, a generic drug company can file an
ANDA and receive a response from the FDA within 180 days 78 if it meets
several statutory requirements. These requirements include submission of
a certification disclosing whether a patent protects the approved pioneer
drug to which the generic drug claims bioequivalence.' 79 The Pharmaceuti-
cal Reform Act, among other things, would limit the scope of the pioneer
patent claims for purposes of this statutory requirement. 8 ' In the proposed
amended statute, "a patent [would] not be considered to claim a listed drug
unless, with respect to such drug, the patent claims an active ingredient."' 81
In addition, the proposed Act would prohibit any state or local government
from limiting substitution of a prescribed pioneer drug for a generic drug
that has been determined to be bioequivalent by the FDA.'82 As mentioned
above, anti-substitution legislation favors generic drug companies at the
expense of pioneer drug companies." This bill, if enacted, would further
tilt the legislative scale in favor of generic drug companies.
Senators John McCain (R-Arizona), Charles Schumer (D-New York),
and Tim Johnson (D-South Dakota),' u and Representatives John Baldacci
(D-Maine) and Tome Coburn (R-Oklahoma)'85 introduced a bill in the
Senate and House, respectively, entitled the "Greater Access to Affordable'
Pharmaceuticals Act of 2000" ("GAAPA"). 86 This proposed legislation
would amend the FFDCA and the Patent Act for the stated purpose of
"mak[ing] generic drugs more available and accessible, and thereby
reduc[ing] health care costs."'87 It purports to achieve this goal by once
again tipping the legislative scale in favor of generic drug companies.
,76 H.R. 523 1.
177 Id
178 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A) (2000).
,79 Id § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
8' See H.R. 5231.
181 Id
182 Id
'8 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
'84 S. 3051, 106th Cong. (2000).
'85 H.R. 5247, 106th Cong. (2000).
,86 HR 5247; S. 3051.
,87HR 5247 § 6; S. 3051 § 6.
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GAAPA may allow further infringement of pioneer patents by generic
companies. In addition to a patent covering the composition of a drug, a
pioneer company may have invented a novel method of producing the drug.
The novel production method may be entitled to patent protection separate
from the patent protecting the drug composition.' The Bolar
Amendment,' found in the 1984 Act, provides certain exceptions to
infringement of drug composition patents for generic drug companies
seeking FDA approval of a bioequivalent drug by filing an ANDA.' ° The
Amendment did not provide an exception to infringement of pioneer
companies' method of production patents. GAAPA may allow such
infringement."' Currently the statutory prerequisites for a generic drug
company to file an ANDA include submission of a statement that the
applicant does not use a method of producing the proposed generic drug,
which is protected by a method of production patent.'9 GAAPA proposes
to eliminate this requirement 93 as one among other proposals favoring
generic drug companies at the expense of pioneer drug companies.
Ultimately, in the attempt to lower health care costs, legislators want
to take an intellectual property scheme that already disfavors pioneer drug
companies and make it even more disadvantageous. This method of
attacking health care costs has the potential to adversely affect society. By
increasing the risks inherent in creating new drugs, the proposals essentially
decrease a pioneer company's incentive to invest in new drug development.
'8 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1995); id §§ 102-103 (2000).
n91 d § 271(eX1) (2000); see generally Reid, supra note 120, at 339 n.39.
190 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
' S. 3051, 106th Cong. (2000). The GAAPA proposes completely striking
21 U.S.C. § 355(bX2)(B) and § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). These subparagraphs state as
follows:
If with respect to the drug for which investigations described in
paragraph (1)(A) [safety and efficacy reports] were conducted information
was filed.., for a method of use patent which does not claim a use for
which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection, a statement
that the method of use patent does not claim such a use.
21 U.S.C. § 355(bX2)(B).
If with respect to [the FDA approved drug to which the new generic
drug is bioequivalent] information was filed under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section for a method of use patent which does not claim a use for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection, a statement that the
method of use patent does not claim such a use.
Id § 355(X2XAXviii).
,92 21 U.S.C. § 355(jX2)(A) (2000).
" S. 3051; H.R. 5247.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The result is potentially decreased availability of new drugs, as well as
increased overall health care costs for Americans.
V. SOCIETAL COSTS GENERATED BY
TRUNCATED PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERMS
Monopolies are not only illegal in the United States,"g but the idea of
limiting the potential for competition is adverse to the idea of a capitalist
society. Thus, it would not be a surprise to discover that many Americans
could be naturally skeptical of the limited monopolies associated with
patent terms. The pharmaceutical industry, however, is one that could not
function without these limited monopolies. Because of the nature of this
class of products, a competitor can copy a new drug with great ease.
Without the protection of a patent, immediate competition from generic
companies copying and marketing a new drug make the risk of investing in
a new drug far too great to justify proceeding with new research and
development. Society has patent terms to thank for the availability of
beneficial new drugs.
Clearly, complete elimination of a pharmaceutical patent term would
be detrimental to a society that wishes to have access to new drugs;
however, the societal costs generated by truncated pharmaceutical patent
terms may not be as intuitive. The following hypothetical attempts to
illustrate this point. 5
A. Societal Costs Generated by the Shortened Effective Patent Terms:
A Hypothetical
Incentive to invest in drug development is correlated to the risk
associated with the future income streams that a new drug will generate.
Although the profit generated from a drug is potentially very high, the
potential loss associated with investing in a drug that is not profitable or
that generates substantial liabilities is also great. This large dispersion in
outcomes produces a significant risk.
Consider the following scenario. Company P developed Drug X as a
potential cancer suppressing agent for women who have previously battled
'94 See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1995); Clayton Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
195 This hypothetical is admittedly simplistic and is used only to illustrate the
role that pharmaceutical patent terms play in determining whether to invest in the
development of a new drug.
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breast cancer. Drug Xgenerated optimistic data in both cultured cells and
in preliminary animal studies. Company P is considering obtaining a patent
for the composition of DrugXand starting the lengthy and expensive FDA
approval process.
If patent protection and FDA approval for Drug X are received,
valuation experts at the company predict that if Drug X is sold at an
"affordable price," it could make the company $100 million, but it is also
possible that the company could lose $25 million (by being unable to
recoup research and development costs). These figures may vary depending
on the success of marketing and public acceptance, among other things.
Ultimately, the investment appears to be financially sound.
Because Company G, a manufacturer of generic drugs in the area of
cancer suppressing agents, is likely to pursue FDA approval of a generic
version of Drug X, the term that Company P may market Drug X exclu-
sively is likely to be truncated. When the shortened effective patent term
is factored in, the most optimistic return on the investment remains at $100
million; however, the most pessimistic return must be recalculated. Experts
estimate that the company could lose $100 million.
Although the total utility of the income generated from investment in
DrugXwill increase with each dollar, the marginal utility does not increase
with each dollar. Said another way, the utility generated by gaining $100
million is less than the detriment generated by losing $100 million. The
increased dispersion in outcomes associated with a shorter effective patent
term has made further investment in Drug Xan unwise financial decision.
However, experts from Company P determine that by increasing the
price of the drug to a "very expensive price," enough consumers will still
be able to purchase the drug and its maximum return could be increased to
as much as $125 million. Increasing the cost of Drug X can salvage the
investment. Shorter patent terms can actually cause pharmaceutical cost to
increase.
The company must also consider other risk factors such as competition
from other pioneer drug companies, products liability suits, and the
possibility that legislation will be passed to further shorten the effective
patent term of Drug X. If experts from Company P calculate that the price
of DrugXcannot be further raised without severely limiting the number of
consumers that could afford the drug, thus making it impossible to raise the
maximum possible return any further, the investment cannot be salvaged.
Herein lies the ultimate problem. Such deterrence has two detrimental
results: (1) harming those people whose lives could be benefitted or saved
by the drug, and (2) increasing overall health care costs. By limiting the
availability of drugs based on the fear that they may be too expensive for
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the American consumer, the potentially beneficial drug never makes it to
market and never has the ability to help those it was designed to benefit.
With regard to increasing health care costs, one must consider that the
most efficient ways to cut these costs may be through preventative
treatment. If drugs can prevent medical problems such as strokes or
facilitate the management of diseases such as cancer, then expensive
hospital visits, surgeries, and treatments can be eliminated or greatly
reduced." Because drugs are a cost-effective alternative to many other
health care options, it is imperative that the development of novel and
improved pharmaceuticals is not stifled when attempting to reduce
Americans' health care expenses.
CONCLUSION
The legislative acts and administrative regulations put in place by the
1984 Act resulted in increasing the risk of investing in drug innovation.'97
Generic companies now enjoy a shortened FDA approval time. The usual
period between patent expiration and generic entry has decreased from
three or four years prior to 1984, to one or two months. 98 When a generic
drug entered the marketplace prior to 1984, it received a 12.7% share of the
market.' " Today, upon entering the market, a generic drug quickly climbs
to a 57.6% share of the market.2'
In the world of intellectual property term protection, no inventor is at
more of a disadvantage than the pioneer drug developer. The effective
patent term of a pioneer drug is statutorily set below the average effective
patent life for products other than pharmaceuticals,2 0' allowing a maximum
life of only fourteen years after the 1984 Act extension.2 2 Furthermore, not
all patents are eligible for this extension.20 3 The average effective patent
term for pioneer drugs is actually only eleven or twelve years, which is
approximately forty percent lower than the effective term for other patented
products.0 4
" See Reid, supra note 120, at 330-36.
'
97 See supra Part IV.
198 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 13, at 38.
199Id at 39.
200 Id
20 1 PhMA Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102 (compare eighteen and
a half years to eleven to twelve years for pharmaceuticals).
202 Id.
203 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000).
204 PhRM Industry Profile 2000, supra note 13, at 102-03.
[VOL. 90
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION
Legislators seem to justify this disparity by arguing that drugs have
such a high utility that they need to be more available to the consumers. In
order to effectuate increased availability, drug prices must be decreased.
This may be accomplished by expediting generic market entry, but the
result may be detrimental to the pioneer drug market.205 However, it seems
more logical to argue that because pharmaceuticals have such a high social
utility, the incentive for pioneer drug development should be greater than
the incentive to create inventions of low social utility. Passing legislation
that further decreases pharmaceutical patent terms, in effect, reduces the
incentive to invest in the development of these highly useful compounds
because of the potential risk of being unable to recover the costs of research
and development.
Decreasing the cost of prescription drugs while continuing the
incentive to invent new drugs is a difficult balance to achieve. Congress has
purported to pass legislation in the past aimed at achieving this balance.2 °6
Realistically, the scales continue to be tipped in favor of generic drug
companies. Legislation has recently been proposed that will attempt to
"reduce health care costs"2 °7 by lowering prescription drug costs. Decreas-
ing the effective patent term of pioneer drugs, thus allowing generic drugs
accelerated entry into the marketplace, will initially lower prescription
drug costs. However, decreased effective patent terms for drugs will
adversely affect incentive to invest in development of new drugs, leading
to a decreased number of novel drug treatments being introduced in the
future.
The cost of drugs is an important consumer concem, 2 °S but high-priced,
cutting-edge drugs may be more cost-effective than initially apparent.
"When one considers the costs deferred by drug treatment such as: (1)
surgical intervention, (2) pain and suffering, (3) loss of time from work, (4)
quality of life decline, and (5) pre-mature loss of life, it becomes apparent
that society should reward the pharmaceutical industry for inventing the[se]
drug[s]."2' One of the most efficient ways to cut health care costs is
205 See supra notes 104-60, 174-93 and accompanying text.
206 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); Reid, supra note 120, at 327 (quoting
Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GA T7: Hearings onS. 1277Beforethe
Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 96, 96-97 (1998) (prepared statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch)).
217 S. 3051, 106th Cong. (2000).
2 8 See generally Noonan, supra note 1.
209Mlenkovich, supra note 106, at 773.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
through preventative treatment2 -- including pharmaceuticals geared to
preventing medical problems before expensive hospital care is required.21'
In addition to being a cost-effective alternative to other medical
treatment options, drugs have the ability to save and improve lives. Because
of this social benefit, the law must not truncate patent terms to the point
that the risk of drug investment becomes too great tojustify any innovation
in pharmaceuticals.
211 Sd.
"' See supra text accompanying note 196.
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